Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Search warrants and online data: Getting real

There was good news yesterday for Internet intermediaries and other cloud-computing service providers. In a highly readable decision (PDF) from Judge Danny Boggs of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held that key provisions of the Stored Communications Act are unconstitutional. The case is U.S. v. Warshak.
Under SCA, law enforcement agents can compel Internet service providers to disclose the contents of private communications they hold on behalf of users. Such communications include, of course, personal and business e-mail, along with other documents, photos, and videos maintained on third-party computers in the rapidly expanding cloud-computing architecture.
While the disclosure of telephone calls and traditional mail ordinarily require a search warrant, SCA gave investigators access to e-mail and other electronic documents without the same level of judicial oversight. SCA orders, for example, do not require a showing of probable cause.
The SCA, a 1986 amendment to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, has long been viewed as dangerously outdated by the evolution of electronic communications as a principal means of business and personal interaction. SCA applies, for example, to any stored communications that the intermediary has on its systems for more than 180 days.
In 1986, stored information was likely held in transit en route to a user's computer. The expectation may have been that data left for more than 180 days had essentially been abandoned.
Male enhancement yields massive fraud
Yesterday's decision involved the operation of the benignly named Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, a company now operating under the name Vianda that started as a family business but which grew to more than $250 million a year in sales, with the introduction of its flagship product, Enzyte. Enzyte, a supplement, promises to magically and dramatically extend the size of a consumer's penis.
Under modern Fourth Amendment analysis, judges focus less on whether an investigator "searched" or "seized" something tangible from the defendant and more on whether the collection of evidence in any form violated an "expectation of privacy."
Perhaps to no one's surprise, the product, its development, marketing, sales, and operations all turned out to be an enormous fraud. The names and existence of two scientists who had supposedly developed the product were made up, as were data in "studies" of the product's efficacy and in customer satisfaction "surveys." Customers were put on automatic-payment plans without their knowledge, and the company played games with credit card transactions to keep from being cut off from merchant banks due to high chargeback volumes.
The Better Business Bureau compiled thousands of complaints--though not, apparently, about the product so much as the auto-shipping plan.
At issue in yesterday's decision was evidence collected by the federal grand jury from an Internet service provider used by Berkeley's principals. Although investigators complied with the SCA, the court held that disclosure of some 27,000 e-mails required a warrant to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. That Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," a response to roving searches by British customs agents before the American Revolution.
Since the investigators had a good-faith basis to believe the SCA was constitutional, criminal convictions for Berkeley's executives will not be overturned. But "to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such e-mails warrantlessly," the decision holds that henceforth, "the SCA is unconstitutional."
A big win for cloud providers--as well as users
The decision, assuming it survives a potential appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, marks a major turning point in the evolution of Fourth Amendment law in the Digital Age.
Congress and the courts have struggled since the dawn of computers to understand just what kind of protections are appropriate for users of third-party computer services, from time-sharing systems in the 1960s to today's consumer-oriented cloud services, including e-mail, social networking, document and other work space collaboration, and text messages.
Law enforcement agencies have consistently argued that advances in computing make it easier for criminals to hide their activities, necessitating looser standards for criminal investigations to remain effective.
Civil-liberties groups have taken the opposite view, noting that new technologies including infrared cameras, electronic surveillance, and forensic analysis expand the ability of police to intrude on traditionally private and even intimate aspects of the lives of ordinary citizens.
Courts are regularly called upon to balance these two views. Under modern Fourth Amendment analysis, judges focus less on whether an investigator "searched" or "seized" something tangible from the defendant and more on whether the collection of evidence in any form violated an "expectation of privacy."
If that expectation is "reasonable," the Supreme Court has held, then the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant based on probable cause and approved by a judge or other judicial officer.
What constitutes a "reasonable" expectation of privacy, however, necessarily changes over time with the evolution of social norms driven by new technology.
When home telephones were connected via shared, or "party," lines in the 1920s, for example, courts found no reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of those calls. By 1968, however, the Supreme Court held in the seminal Katz case that a user of a phone booth had a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court in that case rejected the use of evidence collected by police who attached a listening device to the outside of the booth.
Today, cell phone calls cannot be intercepted without warrants, but users who conduct their side of the conversation in public places do not enjoy Fourth Amendment protections.
To take another example, trash kept in cans inside a fenced yard of one's home cannot be searched without a warrant, but once the can is placed on the curb, the expectation of privacy disappears. In a case decided last month in Chicago, another circuit court held that trash cans behind a fence can be searched without a warrant during the winter, because a local ordinance prohibits taking cans to the curb and requires residents to provide access to trash collectors.
As these and many other cases suggest, "reasonable" privacy expectations are constantly being re-examined in light of changing conditions and social norms.
Law enforcement agencies have long argued that users who store data with third parties cannot reasonably expect such data to be protected by the Fourth Amendment. The Sixth Circuit disagreed. The judges explicitly rejected the view that since most terms-of-service agreements include provisions that allow an ISP to inspect or audit the user's information, users cannot reasonably expect that their data is private, once stored in the cloud.
The same provisions, the court noted, also apply to telephone service--and did so at the time of the Katz decision. "Given the fundamental similarities between e-mail and traditional forms of communication," the court reasoned, "it would defy common sense to afford e-mails lesser Fourth Amendment protection."
The decision, if upheld and adopted by other circuits, is a win not only for individuals but also for Internet intermediaries. There was never any doubt that data stored locally on a user's home computer could not be searched without a warrant. But if the same information was stored on a remote computer or anywhere in the cloud, the SCA put service providers in the uncomfortable position of having to retain and turn it over to police without a warrant, often without disclosing that fact to the user.
Uncertainty over whether, and under what circumstances, data stored with a third party was entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protections as local data was seen by many leading cloud providers as a serious limitation on the value and usefulness of their service to consumers. Cloud providers, including Google, felt obliged to warn users that e-mails and other data stored for more than 180 days suddenly lost constitutional protections.
With the warrantless provisions of the SCA voided, consumers would no longer forfeit their Fourth Amendment rights simply by moving storage to the more flexible and convenient cloud.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation, along with a wide range of public-interest groups of all political persuasions, have argued for many years that SCA and other provisions of the ECPA are sorely in need of congressional update.
The "Digital Due Process Coalition," as the group calls itself, certainly has a point. The last time such laws were given serious attention, there was no commercial Internet.

Source: http://news.cnet.com

Report of FBI back door roils OpenBSD community

Allegations that the FBI surreptitiously placed a back door into the OpenBSD operating system have alarmed the computer security community, prompting calls for an audit of the source code and claims that the charges must be a hoax. 
The report surfaced in e-mail made public yesterday from a former government contractor, who alleged that he worked with the FBI to implement "a number of back doors" in OpenBSD, which has a reputation for high security and is used in some commercial products.
Gregory Perry, the former chief technologist at the now-defunct contractor Network Security Technology, or NETSEC, said he's disclosing this information now because his 10-year confidentiality agreement with the FBI has expired. The e-mail was sent to OpenBSD founder Theo de Raadt, who posted it publicly.
"I cashed out of the company shortly after the FBI project," Perry told CNET today. "At that time there were significant legal barriers between domestic law enforcement and [the Department of Defense], and [this project] was in clear violation of that." He said the project was a "circa 1999 joint research and development project between the FBI and the NSA," which is part of the Defense Department.
The OpenBSD project, which was once funded by DARPA but had its funding yanked in 2003 for unspecified reasons, says that it takes an "uncompromising view toward increased security." The code is used in Microsoft's Windows Services for Unix and firewalls including ones sold by Calyptix Security, Germany's Swapspace.de, and Switzerland's Apsis GmbH.
In national security circles, it's an open secret that the U.S. government likes to implant back doors in encryption products.
That's what the FBI proposed in September, although it also claimed that the crypto-back doors would be used only through a legal process. So did the Clinton administration, in what was its first technology initiative in the early 1990s, which became known as the Clipper Chip.
(Credit: Openbsd.org)
If implemented correctly using a strong algorithm, modern encryption tools are believed to be so secure that even the NSA's phalanxes of supercomputers are unable to decrypt messages or stored data. One report noted that, even in the 1990s, the FBI was unable to successfully decrypt communications from some wiretaps, and a report this year said it could not decrypt hard drives using the AES algorithm with a 256-bit key.
E.J. Hilbert, a former FBI agent, indicated in a note on Twitter last night that the OpenBSD "experiment" happened but was unsuccessful.
The Justice Department did not respond to a request from CNET yesterday for comment.
NETSEC, the now-defunct contractor, boasted at the time that it was a top provider of computer security services to the Justice Department, the Treasury Department, the National Science Foundation, and unnamed intelligence agencies. A 2002 NSF document (PDF) says NETSEC was "a contractor that NSF utilizes for computer forensics" that performed an investigation of whether data "deleted from an internal NSF server" amounted to a malicious act or not.
A snapshot of the NETSEC Web page from August 2000 from Archive.org shows that the company touted its close ties with the NSA. The founders created the company to build "upon practices developed while employed at the National Security Agency (NSA) and Department of Defense (DoD), the methodologies utilized at NETSEC today are widely regarded as the best anywhere," it says.
On the OpenBSD technical mailing list, reaction was concerned but skeptical. One post suggested that the best way to insert a back door would be to leak information about the cryptographic key through the network, perhaps through what's known as a side channel attack. (A 2000 paper describes that technique as using information about the specific implementation of the algorithm to break a cipher, in much the same way that radiation from a computer monitor can leak information about what's on the screen. Secure environments use TEMPEST shielding to block that particular side channel.)
A 1999 New York Times article written by Peter Wayner about the Clinton administration's encryption policies, which quoted Perry about OpenBSD, noted that the "the Naval Research Lab in Virginia is using OpenBSD as a foundation of its new IPv6 project."
Perry told CNET that he hired Jason Wright "at NETSEC as a security researcher, he was basically paid to develop full time for the OpenBSD platform." In the e-mail to de Raadt, Perry added that "Jason Wright and several other developers were responsible for those back doors, and you would be well advised to review any and all code commits by Wright as well as the other developers he worked with originating from NETSEC."
Wright's LinkedIn profile lists him as a "senior developer" at the OpenBSD project and a cybersecurity engineer at the Idaho National Laboratory, and previously a software engineer at NETSEC. He did not respond to a request for comment. A decades-long push for back doors
While the OpenBSD allegations may never be fully proved or disproved, it's clear that the federal government has a long history of pressing for back doors into products or networks for eavesdropping purposes. The Bush administration-era controversy over pressuring AT&T to open its network--in apparent violation of federal law--is a recent example.
Louis Tordella, the longest-serving deputy director of the NSA, acknowledged overseeing a similar project to intercept telegrams as recently as the 1970s. It relied on the major telegraph companies, including Western Union, secretly turning over copies of all messages sent to or from the United States.
"All of the big international carriers were involved, but none of 'em ever got a nickel for what they did," Tordella said before his death in 1996, according to a history written by L. Britt Snider, a Senate aide who became the CIA's inspector general.
The telegraph interception operation was called Project Shamrock. It involved a courier making daily trips from the NSA's headquarters in Fort Meade, Md., to New York to retrieve digital copies of the telegrams on magnetic tape.
Like the eavesdropping system authorized by President Bush, Project Shamrock had a "watch list" of people in the U.S. whose conversations would be identified and plucked out of the ether by NSA computers. It was intended to be used for foreign intelligence purposes.
Then-President Richard Nixon, plagued by anti-Vietnam protests and worried about foreign influence, ordered that Project Shamrock's electronic ear be turned inward to eavesdrop on American citizens. In 1969, Nixon met with the heads of the NSA, CIA and FBI and authorized a program to intercept "the communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities," meaning international calls, according to James Bamford's 2001 book titled "Body of Secrets."
Nixon later withdrew the formal authorization, but informally, police and intelligence agencies kept adding names to the watch list. At its peak, 600 American citizens appeared on the list, including singer Joan Baez, pediatrician Benjamin Spock, actress Jane Fonda, and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.
Another apparent example of NSA and industry cooperation became public in 1995. The Baltimore Sun reported that for decades NSA had rigged the encryption products of Crypto AG, a Swiss firm, so U.S. eavesdroppers could easily break their codes.
The six-part story, based on interviews with former employees and company documents, said Crypto AG sold its compromised security products to some 120 countries, including prime U.S. intelligence targets such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and Yugoslavia. (Crypto AG disputed the allegations.)

Source: http://news.cnet.com